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# Megaplasmid Dissemination in Multidrug-Resistant *Salmonella* Serotypes from Backyard and Commercial Broiler Production Systems in the Southeastern United States

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## Abstract

Over the past decade, there has been a rise in U.S. backyard poultry ownership, raising concern for residential area antimicrobial-resistant (AMR) *Salmonella* contamination. This study aims to lay the groundwork to better understand the persistence of AMR *Salmonella* in residential broiler production systems and make comparisons with commercial systems. Ten backyard and 10 commercial farms were sampled at three time points across bird production. Both fecal ( $n = 10$ ) and environmental (soil,  $n = 5$ , litter/compost,  $n = 5$ , feeder, and waterer swabs,  $n = 6$ ) samples were collected at each visit on days 10, 31, and 52 of production for backyard farms and days 10, 24, and 38 of production for commercial farms. AMR *Salmonella* was characterized phenotypically by broth microdilution and genotypically by whole-genome sequencing. Overall, *Salmonella* was more prevalent in commercial farm samples (52.31%) over backyard farms (19.10%). Kentucky (sequence type (ST) 152) was the most common serotype found in both backyard and commercial farms. Multidrug-resistant (MDR, resistance to  $\geq 3$  or more antimicrobial classes) isolates were found in both production systems, while ciprofloxacin- and nalidixic acid-resistant and intermediate isolates were more prevalent in commercial (33%) than backyard samples (1%). Plasmids that have been associated with MDR were found in Kentucky and Infantis isolates, particularly IncFIB(K)\_1\_Kpn3 megaplasmid (Infantis). Our study emphasizes the need to understand the selection pressures in disseminating megaplasmids in MDR *Salmonella* in distinct broiler production systems.

**Keywords:** *Salmonella*, broilers, antimicrobial resistance, whole-genome sequencing, backyard poultry

## Introduction

**S**ALMONELLA IS A top foodborne pathogen worldwide and is known to be strongly associated with the number one consumed meat in the United States, broiler chicken (CDC, 2023b). In the United States, backyard broiler farming is on the rise due to consumer push for local foods (Gwin et al.,

2013). Outbreaks of *Salmonella* linked to backyard poultry have occurred consecutively in recent years (2019–2023), which highlights the growing concern for this issue (CDC, 2023c; CDC, 2022b; CDC, 2021; CDC, 2020; CDC, 2019b). Special consideration should be taken for backyard production, as it brings the risk of infection to residential environments surrounding homes. Children and

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immunocompromised individuals are especially at risk given their immune systems are not as robust (CDC, 2023; Christenson, 2013).

Despite the increase in backyard ownership and recent outbreaks, little research is currently investigating *Salmonella* in backyard production systems in the United States. Severe salmonellosis cases warrant antibiotic administration, but emerging antimicrobial-resistant (AMR) *Salmonella* limits safe treatment options (Asperilla et al., 1990; CDC, 2023a). Multidrug-resistant (MDR) *Salmonella*, having resistance to three or more antimicrobial classes, has been reported by the U.S. National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System (NARMS) in retail chicken (Punchihewage-Don et al., 2022). Although antimicrobial use is a known driver for AMR, resistant strains can exist even in the absence of any antimicrobial (Keelara et al., 2013; Quintana-Hayashi and Thakur, 2012). Given the threat of AMR *Salmonella* to consumers and farm owners, more research needs to be put into understanding AMR dynamics in different broiler production environments.

Our farm-to-genome study characterizes *Salmonella* in terms of on-farm prevalence, phenotypic AMR, and genotypic AMR profiling. This study aims to detail the prevalence and AMR of *Salmonella* in backyard broiler production systems and compare outcomes with more established commercial systems.

## Materials and Methods

### Farms

Ten backyard and ten commercial broiler farms in the Southeast United States were recruited for the study. The time frame of farm collection was April 2021 to April 2023. Backyard flocks were selected for sampling if they consisted of broiler breeds raised in a residential setting that were sold for meat consumption or used for home consumption. The flocks ranged in size from 22 to 1000 birds in a flock. Commercial farms were considered to be indoor raised birds as part of a large commercial company. Flock size ranged from 13,500 to 30,900 birds. For commercial farms, a “farm” was considered a single house at a particular location. In other words, there were 10 different commercial farm locations, and the same house was sampled at each visit. Commercial farm visits were split among three different companies.

For the backyard, farms 1 and 7 and farms 5 and 9 were in the same residential location. However, they were sampled in a different season than the first time. Each farm was visited three times across production on days 10, 31, and 52 for backyard farms and days 10, 24, and 38 for commercial farms. Commercial farms had a shortened sampling time line because commercial birds, on average, went to market quicker than backyard birds.

At each backyard and commercial farm visit, fecal samples ( $n=10$ ), litter or compost ( $n=5$ ), soil ( $n=5$ ), and swabs of the feeders and waterers ( $n=6$ ) were collected. Fecal, litter/compost, and soil samples were collected in sterilized closure bags, while swabs were collected in conical cap tubes containing buffered peptone water. For backyard farms, birds tend to be in a brooder with litter for the first visit and on grass for the remaining visits. Depending on availability, compost or leftover litter was collected for all five samples in the

remaining visits. No compost samples were taken from commercial farms, as birds were housed on litter throughout the three visits. For commercial farms, soil samples were taken from just outside the houses.

### Processing

Sample processing began the day samples were collected from the farm. Processing procedures were adopted from NARMS Retail Meat Surveillance Laboratory Protocol, but slightly adjusted to fit our project (McDermott, 2021). Day 1 of processing consisted of pouring 90 mL of buffered peptone water into all sterile closure bags containing samples. All sterile closure bags with samples and buffered peptone water were placed on an automatic shaker at 200 RPM for 15 min and then placed in a 35.0°C incubator for 24 h.

On day 2, 100  $\mu\text{L}$  of the incubated buffered peptone water from each sample was placed in a tube of RV broth and then incubated at 35°C for 24 h. On day 3, a 10  $\mu\text{L}$  inoculation loop was used to streak the incubated RV (BD 218581) broth onto XLT4 (BD 223420) and then incubated at 35.0°C for 24 h. After incubation, one black colony was selected from each plate with a sterile inoculation loop, streaked onto blood agar plates (BAP; BD 221261), and incubated at 35.0°C for another 24 h. The bacterial cultures were then placed into tubes with Brucella broth (BD 211088) and 15% glycerol and stored in a  $-80^\circ\text{C}$  freezer.

For backyard farms, multiple isolates were taken from a single plate for the first five farms. For commercial isolates and remaining backyard farms, only one isolate was taken per plate/sample. Loop-mediated isothermal amplification (LAMP) assay was conducted for 65 random isolates to confirm our isolation protocol.

### Antimicrobial susceptibility testing

The NARMS 2020 Manual of Laboratory Methods was followed for antimicrobial susceptibility testing (NARMS, 2020). Frozen glycerol tubes with *Salmonella* isolates were streaked onto XLT4 (BD 223420) and incubated overnight at 35.0°C for 24 h. One colony was streaked onto BAP (BD 221261) and incubated overnight again at 35.0°C for 24 h. Using a 1  $\mu\text{L}$  inoculation loop, the culture was inoculated in 5 mL of demineralized water and vortexed until adjusted to a 0.5 McFarland Standard. Ten microliters of the adjusted McFarland Standard was then transferred to 11 mL of Mueller Hinton Broth (T3462; Thermo Scientific™) and vortexed. The inoculated Mueller Hinton Broth tube was placed into a Sensititre™ System, which dispensed 50  $\mu\text{L}$  into each well of a 90-well plate.

The NARMS Gram-negative plate was used for broth microdilution testing (CMV3AGNF; Thermo Scientific, Sensititre). Bacterial susceptibility was tested for the following antimicrobials: ceftiofur (FOX; 0.5–32  $\mu\text{g}/\text{mL}$ ), azithromycin (AZI; 0.12–16  $\mu\text{g}/\text{mL}$ ), chloramphenicol (CHL; 2–32  $\mu\text{g}/\text{mL}$ ), tetracycline (TET; 4–32  $\mu\text{g}/\text{mL}$ ), ceftriaxone (AXO; 0.25–64  $\mu\text{g}/\text{mL}$ ), amoxicillin/clavulanic acid (AUG2; 1/0.5–32/16  $\mu\text{g}/\text{mL}$ ), ciprofloxacin (CIP; 0.015–4  $\mu\text{g}/\text{mL}$ ), gentamicin (GEN; 0.25–16  $\mu\text{g}/\text{mL}$ ), nalidixic acid (NAL; 0.5–32  $\mu\text{g}/\text{mL}$ ), ceftiofur (XNL; 0.12–8  $\mu\text{g}/\text{mL}$ ), sulfisoxazole (FIS; 16–256  $\mu\text{g}/\text{mL}$ ), trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole (SXT; 0.12/2.38–4/76  $\mu\text{g}/\text{mL}$ ), ampicillin

(AMP; 1–32  $\mu\text{g}/\text{mL}$ ), and streptomycin (STR; 2–64  $\mu\text{g}/\text{mL}$ ). Plates were manually read with a Sensititre Manual Viewbox  $\sim 24$  h later. We detected the minimum inhibitory concentration (MIC) for each isolate in the study. MIC is defined as the minimum concentration required to inhibit the growth of the bacterial isolate.

NARMS breakpoints were used to determine if isolates were susceptible (therapeutic success likely), intermediate (therapeutic success unknown), or resistant (therapeutic failure likely) (NARMS, 2019; Rodloff et al., 2008).

#### DNA isolation and whole-genome sequencing

For DNA isolation, *Salmonella* freezer stock was streaked onto XLT4 and then BAP (BD 221261). Bacterial genomic DNA was extracted using the Qiagen DNeasy PowerLyzer Microbial Kit (Qiagen, Hilden, Germany) according to the manufacturer's recommendation. Quality and concentration of extracted DNA were determined using a NanoDrop 2000/2000c Spectrophotometer (Thermo Fisher Scientific, Waltham, MA) and a Qubit Flex Fluorometer (Thermo Fisher Scientific). DNA libraries were prepared using the Illumina DNA Prep Kit (Product No. 20060059; Illumina, San Diego, CA) following the manufacturer's instructions. The resulting DNA libraries were requantified using the Qubit Flex Fluorometer. Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) was performed on the Illumina MiSeq System using the MiSeq Reagent Kit v3 600 cycles (Illumina). All samples can be found on the National Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI) under BioProject: PRJNA293224.

#### Bioinformatic pipeline

The bioinformatic pipeline is as described in Hull et al. (2022). Briefly, Amazon Web Services was used to send whole-genome shotgun sequence data through Shovill v1.1.0 and SPAdes version 3.15.2 for *de novo* assembly (Bankevich et al., 2012). Quality of genome assembly was conducted by QUAST v 5.0.2 (Gurevich et al., 2013). The resulting fasta files were blasted against databases to identify AMR and virulence genes using ABRICATE version 1.0.1 (Seemann, 2020). This produced output from databases CARD,

MEGAres, VFDB, and Plasmidfinder (Alcock et al., 2020; Carattoli et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2016; Doster et al., 2020; Feldgarden et al., 2019). Sequences were also passed through MLST v 2.19.0 and AMRFinderPlus. Plasmid data were also assembled through Shovill and PlasmidSPAdes. Plasmid fasta files were screened for AMR and virulence genes using the same pipeline detailed above.

Results from the WGS data and plasmid data were compared to assess carriage of resistance genes on plasmid versus chromosomal DNA.

#### Serotyping and phylogenetic trees


Serotypes were determined through a combination of SeqSero2 v1.1.0, bettercallsal, and NCBI Pathogen Detection (Konganti et al., 2023; NCBI, 2023; Zhang et al., 2019). Phylogenetic trees were created using the online open-access tool REALPHY v1.13 (Bertels et al., 2014). The results were visualized using Interactive Tree of Life (Letunic and Bork, 2021).

#### Statistical analysis

A combination of R-Studio and MedCalc was used for chi-squared testing and overall analysis (MedCalc, 2023; RStudioTeam, 2020). CDC EpiCalc Info StatCalc v5.5.11 software was used to conduct Fisher's exact two-tailed test (CDC, 2022a). Significance was determined with a  $p$ -value  $< 0.05$ .

#### Results

Of the 780 samples collected from each farm type, 149 tested positive in backyard farms for *Salmonella* (19.10%) and 408 tested positive in commercial farms (52.31%; chi-squared,  $p < 0.05$ ). The distribution of positive samples among sample types is displayed in Figure 1, and the exact numbers within farm type and sample are in Table 1. The proportion of positive isolates between farm types was significant for only fecal samples (Fisher's exact,  $p$ -value  $< 0.05$ ). Of the total 557 *Salmonella* isolates collected, 345 of them were sequenced ( $n = 73$  backyard,  $n = 272$  commercial). Isolates were selected for sequencing to obtain representative



**FIG. 1.** Sample distribution. This stacked bar chart shows what proportion of samples came from each sample type (fecal, soil, litter/compost, feeder/waterer swabs). The proportion of all *Salmonella*-positive samples from commercial and backyard farms is included. The proportion of fecal samples was found to be significant between farm types (Fisher's exact,  $p$ -value  $< 0.05$ ).

TABLE 1. POSITIVE SAMPLES ACROSS FARM AND SAMPLE TYPE

Farm	Fecal (n=30)	Soil (n=15)	Litter/compost (n=15)	Swab (n=18)	Total
Backyard 1	0	0	0	0	0
Backyard 2	0	0	8	0	8
Backyard 3	1	1	4	0	6
Backyard 4	12	2	6	3	23
Backyard 5	13	1	4	4	22
Backyard 6	3	2	8	2	15
Backyard 7	15	0	6	3	24
Backyard 8	8	1	1	1	11
Backyard 9	1	0	0	0	1
Backyard 10	23	6	9	1	39
Commercial 1	23	3	9	10	45
Commercial 2	29	6	10	1	46
Commercial 3	29	0	13	3	45
Commercial 4	28	0	14	6	48
Commercial 5	20	1	5	0	26
Commercial 6	24	10	9	0	43
Commercial 7	19	0	1	0	20
Commercial 8	30	2	9	0	41
Commercial 9	30	2	12	0	44
Commercial 10	30	4	14	2	50

This table shows the distribution of positive *Salmonella* samples among the individual backyard and commercial farm types as well as how they were spread among sample types. This includes data from all three visits. A total of  $n=30$  fecal,  $n=15$  soil,  $n=15$  litter/compost, and  $n=18$  feeder and waterer swabs were taken in total from each farm.

samples based on phenotypic resistance, sample type, and farm.

Serotyping revealed the top serotype from both farm systems to be Kentucky (Overall:  $n=103/345$ , 29.86%; Commercial:  $n=72/103$ ; Backyard:  $n=31/103$ ). Along with Kentucky, Anatum ( $n=10/73$ ) and Infantis ( $n=7/73$ ) made up the top three serotypes for backyard farms while Infantis ( $n=53/272$ ) and Thompson ( $n=38/272$ ) were predominant in the commercial production system.

Antimicrobial susceptibility testing was conducted for all isolates (203, backyard; 408, commercial) and the results are displayed in Table 2. Overall, commercial farms did not have a statistically significant proportion of pan-susceptible isolates (48.53%;  $n=198/408$ ) compared with backyard farms (49.26%;  $n=100/203$ ; Fisher's exact;  $p$ -value  $>0.05$ ). Proportions of phenotypic MDR isolates were not statistically significant between farm types, as 25% ( $n=102/408$ ) of commercial isolates and 17.73% ( $n=36/203$ ) of backyard isolates displayed MDR (Fisher's exact;  $p$ -value  $>0.05$ ). The MDR isolates were concentrated in 2 of the 10 backyard farms and 4 of the 10 commercial farms. Of the phenotypic MDR isolates that were sequenced ( $n=64/137$ ), the most common serotype was Infantis ( $n=49/64$ ; 76.56%) and the second most was Kentucky ( $n=11/64$ ; 17.18%) (Fig. 2).

The most prevalent backyard MDR pattern was STR TET FIS GEN (Backyard 12.32%; Commercial 0.98%) and the most prevalent commercial pattern was STR TET FIS NAL (Backyard 0.99%; Commercial 14.95%).

Phenotypic resistance was detected against tetracycline, chloramphenicol, aminoglycoside, and sulfonamide in both farm systems (Table 2). To highlight specific antimicrobials, in commercial farms, 33% ( $n=136/408$ ) of isolates were phenotypically resistant to nalidixic acid and 33% ( $n=136/408$ ) were intermediate to ciprofloxacin. In backyard farms, two isolates ( $\sim 1\%$ ) were resistant to nalidixic acid and two isolates ( $\sim 1\%$ ) were intermediate to ciprofloxacin.

The proportion of isolates that were resistant to these two antimicrobials was statistically significant between backyard and commercial farms (Fisher's exact;  $p$ -value  $<0.05$ ). Of those carrying this phenotype, 71 were sequenced and the top serotype associated was Infantis ( $n=55/71$ ; 77.46%) followed by Enteritidis ( $n=12/71$ ; 16.90%).

Genotypic data revealed resistance genes and point mutation that all together cover multiple antimicrobial classes: aminoglycosides [*aac(3)-IV*, *aac(3)-VIa*, *aac(6')-Iaa*, *aac(6')-Iy*, *ant(3'')-IIa*, *aph(3'')-Ib*, *aph(4)-Ia*, *aph(6)-Id*;  $n=343/345$ ; 99.42%], sulfonamides (*sullI*, *sullII*;  $n=86/345$ ; 24.93%), beta-lactam (*ampH*, *CTX*;  $n=280/345$ ; 81.16%), TET (*tetracycline*, *tetB*, *tetD*;  $n=119/345$ ; 34.49%), phenicol (*floR*;  $n=9/345$ ; 2.61%), trimethoprim (*dfrA*;  $n=9/345$ ; 2.61%), fosfomycin (*fosA*;  $n=2/345$ ; 0.58%), and quinolone (*gyrA-D87y*;  $n=69/345$ ; 20%). In addition, genes responsible for efflux pumps were identified (*acrA*, *acrB*, *emrA*, *emrB*, *gesA*, *gesB*, *gesC*). Of sequenced isolates, 89% ( $n=307/345$ ) carried a plasmid. The most common plasmid detected among all sequenced isolates in both farm types was IncX1\_3 ( $n=132/307$ ; 42.86%). The most common plasmid detected among MDR isolates was IncFIB(K)\_1\_Kpn3 ( $n=49/64$ ). Phenotypic, genotypic, and plasmid data are displayed in Figure 2 for sequenced MDR isolates.

## Discussion

Backyard broiler production is increasing in the United States, yet studies investigating the prevalence and AMR *Salmonella* in these environments are scarce. In our study, 90% of flocks tested positive for *Salmonella*, which is higher than previous studies conducted in Massachusetts (2% of flocks tested positive), Vermont (19% of flocks tested positive), and Washington State (3% of flocks tested positive) (Larsen et al., 2022; McDonagh et al., 2018; Shah et al., 2020). Our commercial farm prevalence was higher than


TABLE 2. SQUASHTOGRAM OF *SALMONELLA* MINIMUM INHIBITORY CONCENTRATIONS

*	Source	% resistant	Distribution of MIC (ug/mL) (# of isolates)																	
			0.015	0.03	0.06	0.12	0.25	0.5	1	2	4	8	16	32	64	128	256	512		
AUG2	Commercial	0%							385	23	0	0	0	0						
	Backyard	0%							191	8	4	0	0	0						
AMP	Commercial	0%							382	26	0	0	0	0						
	Backyard	0%							190	9	3	1	0	0						
AZI	Commercial	0%				0	0	0	4	121	217	59	7							
	Backyard	0%				0	0	0	0	50	141	12	0							
FOX	Commercial	0.25%							2	3	242	155	4	1	<b>1</b>					
	Backyard	0%							0	3	111	82	6	1	0					
XNL	Commercial	0%				0	0	97	304	7	0	0								
	Backyard	0%				0	0	78	119	6	0	0								
AXO	Commercial	0%					408	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0					
	Backyard	0%					203	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0					
GEN <sup>a</sup>	Commercial	1.47%					140	190	12	1	3	56	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>						
	Backyard	15.27%					43	123	6	0	0	0	7	<b>24</b>						
STR <sup>a</sup>	Commercial	33.82%							1	36	147	86	<b>95</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>26</b>					
	Backyard	46.80%							1	9	43	55	<b>5</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>76</b>					
NAL <sup>a</sup>	Commercial	33.33%							1	0	21	246	3	1	0	<b>136</b>				
	Backyard	0.99%							2	3	86	110	0	0	0	<b>2</b>				
CIP	Commercial	0%	238	33	0	16	121	0	0	0	0									
	Backyard	0%	162	39	0	1	1	0	0	0	0									
SXT <sup>a</sup>	Commercial	8.82%				357	14	0	1	0	0	<b>36</b>								
	Backyard	0%				203	0	0	0	0	0									
FIS <sup>a</sup>	Commercial	33.33%										90	179	3	0	0	<b>136</b>			
	Backyard	20.69%										45	40	63	6	7	<b>42</b>			
CHL <sup>a</sup>	Commercial	9.07%							6	240	123	2	0	<b>37</b>						
	Backyard	0%							1	99	99	4	0							
TET <sup>a</sup>	Commercial	34.56%											267	0	0	0	<b>141</b>			
	Backyard	43.35%											115	0	0	0	<b>88</b>			

Displays the range of antimicrobial concentration for each antibiotic used for testing. It shows the number of isolates that had an MIC at each concentration for both backyard and commercial farms. Backyard farm samples tested for include all isolates collected as opposed to all positive samples. The bold numbers represent isolates to be considered resistant according to NARMS breakpoints.

<sup>a</sup>Indicates the proportion of resistant isolates was statistically significant according to farm type (Fisher's exact,  $p$ -value <0.05).

AMP, ampicillin; AUG2, amoxicillin/clavulanic acid; AXO, ceftriaxone; AZI, azithromycin; CHL, chloramphenicol; CIP, ciprofloxacin; FIS, sulfisoxazole; FOX, ceftiofur; GEN, gentamicin; MIC, minimum inhibitory concentration; NAL, nalidixic acid; NARMS, National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System; STR, streptomycin; SXT, trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole; TET, tetracycline; XNL, ceftiofur.



**FIG. 2.** Resistance characterization of MDR isolates. Phenotypically MDR isolates that have been sequenced (n = 63 sequenced/137 Phenotypically MDR) are displayed in the dendrogram. Isolates are listed as SRR#\_Farm\_Type\_Serotype\_Sample source. Circles represent phenotypic resistance to the listed antimicrobials. Outlined circles mean the isolate was determined to be intermediate. Squares show the presence of antimicrobial resistance genes. Squares that are outlined and not filled in represent genes that were found on plasmids. Genes detected in the entire data set beyond MDR isolates are listed. Stars indicated the presence of the plasmids listed. All plasmids found in the entire data set (n = 307) aside from just what is found in MDR isolates are listed. MDR, multidrug resistant.

reported in literature. Our study found 100% of farms testing positive with a 52.31% sample prevalence. A study based on a meta-analysis from literature review estimated a sample prevalence of 22.9% from conventional chicken farms (Golden and Mishra, 2020). Another study investigating conventional and organic commercial broiler farms found a sample prevalence of 38.8% for conventional and a lower prevalence for organic (5.6%) (Alali et al., 2010).

For our study, we sampled both conventional and organic commercial farms. The two farms with lowest percentages of positive samples (25.64% and 33.33%) for *Salmonella* happen to be from organic farms, but other organic farms had comparable numbers with conventional farms in this study (55.13–64.10%).

The dominant serotype for both farm types in our study was Kentucky. All the Kentucky sequence types (STs) in this study were identified as 152 according to multilocus sequence typing (MLST), which is commonly associated with U.S. poultry but not necessarily human illness (Soltys et al., 2021; Tate et al., 2022). Another ST that is commonly associated with Kentucky as well as human illness is ST 198; however, this ST does not appear to be common in U.S. domestic poultry and we did not find it in this study (Soltys et al., 2021; Tate et al., 2022; Vosik et al., 2018; Xiong et al., 2020).

Our study establishes a widespread prevalence of ST 152 in both backyard and commercial production systems in the Southeastern United States, as well as emphasizes its MDR importance. ST 152 is not currently known for *Salmonella* outbreaks; however, it was the second-most common ST associated with MDR in our study. It has been speculated that ST 152 potentially causes mild symptoms that recover quickly and therefore illness is not reported (Tate et al., 2022). This has concerning implications for backyard farms as they potentially expose immunocompromised individuals or children, who may require antimicrobial assistance in recovery.

MDR *Salmonella* is an increasing public health threat worldwide (Ferreira et al., 2020; Gambino et al., 2022; Zhang et al., 2018). Both backyard and commercial farms in our study contained MDR isolates, and the proportions of MDR isolates were not statistically significantly different between farm types. The most recent NARMS (2019) report marks increases in MDR *Salmonella* between 2018 and 2019 with MDR prevalence rising from 20% to 32% (NARMS, 2022). Infantis was identified in both farm types and was the top MDR serotype, supporting NARMS and other literature highlighting this serotype as a culprit for worldwide MDR *Salmonella* emergence and human illness (Alvarez et al., 2023; Hull et al., 2022; NARMS, 2022). We discovered that the prevalence of MDR serotypes was concentrated to specific farms within each system, which highlights the need to identify what environmental pressures or genomic factors could be contributing.

We found many resistance genes not associated with plasmids, potentially creating a stable passing from one generation to the next within serotypes in these farm systems (Storey et al., 2022).

Another important genomic consideration is plasmids, as they are notorious for their spread of AMR genes in *Salmonella* (McMillan et al., 2020). The most common plasmid found overall was IncX1\_3 and was contained in serotypes Kentucky or -8:zi6, a closely associated strain variant

(NCBI, 2023). This plasmid has been noted as MDR previously in association with Kentucky from chicken retail samples (Hull et al., 2022). Our pipeline also identified the IncFIB(K)\_1\_Kpn3 megaplasmid (coverage: 99.64%; identity: 82.80%) in 55 of the total 60 Infantis isolates and in all 3 I -r:1,5 isolates, which appears to be associated with Infantis (NCBI, 2023). This plasmid has also previously been identified as an MDR plasmid associated with chicken samples (Hull et al., 2022).

MDR *Salmonella* Infantis appears to be a major emerging public health threat, given the latest NARMS report and other literature detailing its prevalence in the United States (Hull et al., 2022; NARMS, 2022; Tyson et al., 2021). Two of our backyard farms contained Infantis isolates, and the IncFIB(K)\_1\_Kpn3 megaplasmid was prevalent in the isolates from the farm with MDR isolates. Our findings support concerns about MDR *Salmonella* Infantis spread as well as the role of megaplasmids in AMR dissemination.

Antibiogram results revealed resistance to first-line antimicrobials used for treating *Salmonella* infections, nalidixic acid and ciprofloxacin (CDC, 2019a; Mølbak et al., 2002; Walker et al., 2021). Although this was more prevalent in commercial farms, presence in backyard farms is still concerning given the importance of these antimicrobials. Our findings support data from NARMS noting a decrease in ciprofloxacin-susceptible *Salmonella* isolated from poultry samples (NARMS, 2022). The *gyrA\_D87Y* point mutation is known to confer resistance to these antimicrobials and was present in almost all isolates displaying resistance ( $n=49/52$ ) (CDC, 2019a; Mølbak et al., 2002; Walker et al., 2021). Various efflux pumps, such as AcrAB-TolC and EmrAB, could be the reason for resistance in the remaining isolates, which all happened to be serotype Thompson (Alcock et al., 2020; Alenazy, 2022).

It is important to note that fluoroquinolones have been banned in poultry since 2005 in the United States, emphasizing the need to understand the environmental pressures causing the persistence of resistant bacteria (FDA, 2017). In this study, the majority of isolates containing these resistance markers were Infantis and Enteritidis. These serotypes (Infantis and Enteritidis) have also been linked to recent outbreaks linked to backyard poultry (CDC, 2023c; CDC, 2022c). Serotype Infantis is of particular concern given our findings of MDR in this study, as resistance to first-line antimicrobials as well as other antimicrobial classes threatens viable treatment options.

## Conclusion

Overall, it is evident that risk of AMR *Salmonella* is present without the use of antimicrobials in both backyard and commercial farm settings. We found MDR Kentucky ST 152 to be established in both commercial and backyard broiler farms in the Southeastern United States. Our research also supports the role of megaplasmids in MDR *Salmonella* Infantis, which is a pathogen emerging as a concern worldwide. The prevalence of MDR *Salmonella* serotypes, particularly Infantis, is concerning given its implications for health care burden. Our research highlights the need to assess the effect of unique environmental conditions to better understand AMR *Salmonella* persistence.

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## Authors' Contributions

S.T. presented the idea and obtained funding. R.C. found commercial farms to sample. M.F. found backyard farms to sample and traveled to farms to assist on sampling day. J.L.P., L.H., and M.M. conducted field sampling, planning, and sample processing. L.H. prepared samples for and conducted WGS. J.L.P. performed bioinformatic analysis with insight and assistance from D.H. and L.H. J.L.P. wrote the article with feedback from all the coauthors.

## Disclosure Statement

The authors declare that they have no competing interests.

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